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Ms. Moncharsh:

At your request, I have reviewed the Draft EIR (DEIR) for a proposed expansion of the Head Royce School (HRS). I have specifically analyzed the following areas that fall under my professional expertise:

- **Chapter 16**—*Wildfire and Emergency Evacuation*,
- **Appendix 16A**— *Vegetation Management Plan and Fire Safety Phasing Plan for Defensible Space of the Head-Royce School*; and,
- **Appendix 16B**—*Evacuation Planning Recommendations for Head-Royce School*
- **Emergency Plan for Head Royce School**—*obtained from the City of Oakland and provided to me for review*

Professional Background: My background consists of a professional fire service career spanning over 45 years, rising through the fire service ranks from firefighter and engine company officer to include over 30 years as a chief officer (Battalion Chief, Operations Chief, Fire Marshal, and Fire Chief). My responsibility within the chief officer ranks not only included fire administration and incident command, but also California Fire Code regulatory compliance and enforcement, oversight and direct management of local emergency services, local hazard mitigation planning (including emergency evacuation planning), and emergency/disaster response operations. I also have a proven background in interim chief and fire marshal service (post-retirement), as well as consulting on local hazard mitigation, emergency planning, and fire prevention bureau administration and operations.

Current Wildfire Risks: The current risk of wildfires in Northern California, including the Bay Area, has increased dramatically over the past five years—due to unprecedented climate change and drought conditions. The dry fuel and extreme weather (summertime dry-lightning strikes, and record-high wind events) serve only to amplify conditions for extremely high fire danger. Historically, California Fire Season has lasted from mid-to-late May, through late October (or the first seasonal rains). However, in recent history, the California Fire Season has become a year-round event. Here are the salient points from the last three California Fire Seasons:

- ***The 2019 California Fire Season*** stretched from January 1 to December 19, burning over 259,823 California acres in 7,860 incidents, costing \$163M in suppression efforts (2019 USD).
- ***The 2020 California Fire Season*** ran from February 15 to December 31, and burned 4,397,809 California acres, causing over \$12.079B in damage (2020 USD) --the August Complex Fire alone, accounting for 1.03M acres.
- ***The 2021 California Fire Season*** started on January 14, and year-to-date has burned over 3,083,507 (and counting) Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones acres from wildfires. *The 2021 Fire Season is not due to end until December 26th.*

(See CalFire Stats, Incidents-by-Year: <https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2021/>)

However, wildfire destruction is not confined to fuels of the landscape, as there is tremendous risk to life and property where people live, work, and go to school in adjacent Wildland-Urban Interface areas. This is particularly poignant in the CalFire designated Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones of the Lincoln Heights neighborhood of the Oakland Hills below Highway 13—where HRS is located. Moreover, available firefighting resources are spread more thinly, as the number and size of fires increases annually all over California —taxing resources of the State Master Mutual-Aid Agreement¹ to respond locally.

Historical California Wildfire References²:

- **July 7-17, 1985: The Lexington Fire** (Los Gatos CA). 13,800 acres burned. At the time, the largest fire mutual-aid effort in U.S. history, involving over 200 responding agencies.
- **October 19-23, 1991: The Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm (The Tunnel Fire)** (Oakland, CA). 1500 acres burned, 2800 structures destroyed, (\$1.5B of damage in 1991 USD), 25 fatalities. (*This was the 3rd deadliest, and 3rd most destructive fire in California history*). **400 engines, and 1,500 personnel, from 250 agencies responded. Only Contra Costa County is chronicled in the FEMA Report, Appendix-D (21 strike Teams from 16 agencies). A Strike Team is 5 engines and 1 Battalion Chief.** Strike Teams also responded from Marin, Santa Clara, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties. <https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-060.pdf>
- **October 8-31, 2017: The Tubbs Fire** (Sonoma County, CA). 38,807 acres burned, 2,834 structures destroyed³ (\$1.3B of damage in 2017 USD), 22 fatalities. (*The 4th deadliest, and 2nd most destructive fire in California history*).
- **November 8-25, 2018: The Camp Fire** (Paradise/Chic, CA), CA. 153,336 acres burned, 18,804 structures destroyed (\$16.65B of damage in 2018 USD), and 88 fatalities. (*The deadliest, and most destructive fire in California history*).
- **August 16 –November 12, 2020: The August Complex Fire** (Glenn, Lake, Mendocino, Tehama, Trinity, and Shasta Counties, CA). 1,032,648 acres, 935 structures destroyed, (>\$319.8 million of damage in 2020 USD), 1 fatality.
- **July 13 – October 25, 2021: The Dixie Fire** (Butte, Plumas, Lassen, Shasta, and Tehama Counties, CA). 963,309 acres burned, 1,329 structures destroyed, 1 fatality. *The Dixie Fire resulted in the most expensive fire-suppression effort in California history. By mid-October, three months into the fire, fire suppression costs had exceeded \$610M.*

¹ The California Master Mutual Aid Agreement has been in effect since 1950 (and includes all 58 counties and nearly every City and Special District as signatories), to provide mutual-aid emergency response—statewide—upon request. [https://www.caloes.ca.gov/FireRescueSite/Documents/CalOES - Fire and Rescue - Mutual Aid Plan.pdf](https://www.caloes.ca.gov/FireRescueSite/Documents/CalOES_-_Fire_and_Rescue_-_Mutual_Aid_Plan.pdf)

² CalFire Stats and Events

Top 20 Most Destructive California Fires: https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/t1rdhizr/top20_destruction.pdf

Top 20 Deadliest California Fires: https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/lbfd0m2f/top20_deadliest.pdf

California Wildfires/Acres all Jurisdictions: <https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/11397/fires-acres-all-agencies-thru-2018.pdf>

Suppression Costs: <https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/px5lnaaw/suppressioncostsonepage1.pdf>

³ Sonoma County has four "historic wildfire corridors...New homes in the fire zones are required to meet building code requirements for fire-resistant materials for siding, roofing, and decks, with protected eaves to keep out windblown embers Those measures made little difference in the Tubbs Fire. For example, **despite a 100-foot fire break** that ringed much of the Fountaingrove II subdivision, [of the Coffey Park neighborhood] which consisted of 600 upscale homes in the same path as the **1964 Hanly Fire, virtually the entire subdivision was destroyed by the Tubbs Fire.**

It is worth noting that the 1991 East Bay Oakland Hills Firestorm (The Tunnel Fire) is both the 3rd deadliest, and 3rd most destructive fire in California history⁴. Moreover, the conditions of a Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone (VHFHSZ) and the topography, combined with ever increasing wind and fire danger causing the number of “extreme fire and weather danger” days to rise annually, presents a case for the weather and fire danger situation not improving in the Lincoln Heights neighborhood over time.

Quite to the contrary, the HRS proposed increase in student census (344) of a vulnerable population in the neighborhood (K-12—particularly the primary grades; not to mention ADA considerations) only serves to exacerbate the existing challenging circumstances for a safe, successful mass evacuation of students, faculty, and staff—in concert with local residents—during a wildfire, earthquake or other life-safety or panic emergency. This is a *significant impact*.

With the existence of a very real threat from all the dangers associated with wildfires in the Oakland Hills, including the Lincoln Heights neighborhood, the DEIR should have specifically analyzed how the project would include adequate mass evacuation for the school and the neighborhood residents simultaneously. However, the DEIR does not consider this analysis at all.

Response to the DEIR and Appendices:

DEIR Fire Safety and Fire Management Plans:

The DEIR Chapter 16, pages 16-12, 16-13 cites the four key fire safety and fire management plans in effect for Alameda County, since the 1991 Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm: (ALCO Community Wildfire Protection Plan; CalFire/Santa Clara Unit Strategic Fire Plan; EBRPD East Bay Hills Wildfire Hazard Reduction, Resource Management Plan and EIR; and Fire Hazard Mitigation Program & Fuel Management Plan for the East Bay Hills. Oakland and Berkeley have also applied for FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation funding (PDMs) comprising six projects over 359 acres, under the FEMA Hazardous Fire Risk Reduction Project. *However, these critical projects have not been funded.*

Opinion:

These programs are comprehensive and serve to mitigate the fire danger in the East Bay Hills. And, while the Oakland Fire Department (OFD) Vegetation Management Unit (VMU) is one of the best of its kind, anywhere, there is no program or combination of programs that will entirely mitigate the catastrophic, worst-case scenario disaster (e.g., evidenced by the recent California Wildfire History).

In the DEIR, Chapter 16, page 16-14 there is much discussion about the elements of planning an evacuation. However, the DEIR does not address HRS adding 344 additional students (+staff) to an already limited (and over-burdened) evacuation route scenario. That is why it is so very critical to manage the effects of human actions and minimize exposure of the at-risk population to the threat of fire, by not crowding more people into a vulnerable area with limited egress. The best contribution an organization can make is to not add to the complexities of the problem, but to present solutions of a manageable number of people and a comprehensive emergency action plan (including a mass evacuation planning component), as part of the organization’s best business practices.

DEIR State Emergency Response Plan--Evacuation Planning:

The DEIR Chapter 16, pages 16-13, 16-14 discusses the State Emergency Response Plan--Evacuation Planning, with several references to early information. Mr. Stephen Wong cites (the DEIR Appendix 16B, pages 5, 6) the unlikely guidance provided from local officials in an extreme wildfire event.

⁴ CalFire Stats and Events

- Top 20 Most Destructive California Fires: https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/t1rdhizr/top20_destruction.pdf
- Top 20 Deadliest California Fires: https://www.fire.ca.gov/media/lbfd0m2f/top20_deadliest.pdf

Opinion:

The Emergency Management System provides for a liaison relationship between HRS and City Emergency Operations. HRS should move immediately to avail themselves of this emergency response connection. Additionally, Alameda County has a no-cost county-wide public alerting system provided by Everbridge (called **AC Alert**). Oakland first-responders have access to this technology to broadcast incident-specific messages for any event. The HRS Safety Officer should be made aware of this, and key decision-makers (if not all staff) in the HRS emergency plan command staff should be subscribers.

AC Alert can be accessed online in just a few minutes and can be customized by the subscriber to receive alerts via: voice, text, email, or all three. See link:

<https://www.acgov.org/emergencysite/documents/ACAlertSignUp.pdf>

DEIR Wildfire Impact and Significance:

The DEIR, Chapter 16 concludes on page 16-17 that the impact of a wildfire hazardous situation for students, employees, and neighbors is “less than significant.”

Opinion:

I strenuously disagree with this premise, as a localized vegetation management program alone will not mitigate the worst-case scenario in the VHFHSZ (e.g., 1991 Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm; 2017 Tubbs Fire in which the Coffey neighborhood of 600 homes—with a 100-foot firebreak perimeter, fire safe building components and green-belted defensible space—was completely destroyed by fire, down to the foundations. (See footnote-3 on page 2)

The very nature of an evolving severity in the California Wildfire Season, weather and fire danger, and Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) threat impacts, renders the DEIR statements (page 16-___) as to the “...*impact of the hazardous situation...being less than significant*” as completely unfounded. When in fact, for all the reasons cited herein, the risk is at an all-time high and without any significant mitigation measures demonstrated in the DEIR.

DEIR Emergency Evacuation Plans:

The DEIR, chapter 16, page 16-22 concludes that, “*The Project would not impair the implementation of, or physically interfere with an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan [as] (Less than significant)*”

The DEIR goes on to say (same page reference) that “...*the City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan encourages development of plans, in conjunction with the fire jurisdictions...*”

The DEIR further concludes, (same page reference) “*With a Diablo wind event and favorable fire conditions (including long range fire spotting) a wildfire that begins in the Oakland Hills could reach Head-Royce School within 15-30 minutes.*”

Opinion:

I disagree with the “**Less than significant**” conclusion, as the DEIR in no way addresses the effect of an additional 344 students (+staff)—an increase of 38% in the student census—in the capacity of a pedestrian emergency mass evacuation during a wildfire.

Moreover, it is clearly indicated throughout DEIR Chapter 16, and Appendix 16B, that HRS has not interacted with the City of Oakland regarding emergency planning, mass evacuations, or emergency communications. And, it is only mentioned on page 16-22, that, “...*the City’s Local Hazard Mitigation Plan encourages development of plans, in conjunction with the fire jurisdictions...*” There is no mention

or reference in the DEIR that HRS has initiated any such effort to coordinate with the OFD in this regard—made evident by the analysis of Mr. Stephen Wong, regarding the HRS emergency evacuation plan, detailed in Appendix 16B.

The third DEIR reference on page 16-22, is that of a Diablo wind-driven wildfire event in the Oakland Hills being able to reach HRS in 15-30 minutes. This further punctuates the urgent need for a more thorough emergency evacuation plan, that is realistic, on-going, and verifiable.

DEIR Mitigation Measures:

The DEIR Chapter 16, page 16-25, concludes regarding mitigation measures: *“None required. The Project will not limit emergency access, impede emergency response or create hazardous conditions for the public related to emergency access or evacuation, and the impact would be less than significant.”* The DEIR goes on to say that *“...the Project will not make a significant contribution to this cumulative effect...”*

Opinion:

The DEIR conclusion relies heavily upon the elements of the localized vegetation management plan, the HRS emergency plan, and OFD Fire Code enforcement (e.g., annual vegetation management inspections). As stated previously, the OFD VMU is one of the best of its kind, anywhere. However, this is a once annual inspection, and HRS has no demonstrable track record for the capacity necessary to implement a maintenance of effort for all of the prescribed elements contained of the vegetation management plan contained in DEIR Chapter 16, Appendix 16B.

Additionally, the HRS Emergency Plan lacks serious content. The missing salient points being:

- The absence of a realistic, on-going, and verifiable emergency mass evacuation plan that addresses:
 - Obstacles to viable egress pathways, (gates, stairs, hills), gate openings, (narrow, locked, unmarked, absence of emergency back-up power).
- No student and staff accountability procedures.
- No procedures for managing primary grade children (K-6).
- No ADA compliance.
- No established evacuation training and exercise plan (students, staff, parents) for effectiveness during emergencies.

DEIR Evidence Before the Oakland City Council:

With all recent California fire history evidence to the contrary, the City Council should not be satisfied to continue treating the threat of fire danger to HRS as “...very unlikely...” (to quote Mr. Stephen Wong, Appendix 16B, page 7)

Opinion:

In view of all that has been done, and all that will be done, to mitigate the threat of another Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm, the HRS campus remains in the VHFHSZ. Moreover, HRS already introduces a highly vulnerable portion of the population into an environment that is extremely difficult to evacuate properly. HRS should not be considered for an expanded facility that adds 344 more students to the situational equation, until such time as HRS can satisfactorily implement a realistic, ongoing, and verifiable emergency plan, in conjunction with a well-established implementation of the prescriptive vegetation management plan as thoroughly outlined in Appendix 16A.

Head-Royce School Vegetation Management Plan (WRM Prescription):

In appendix 16A, the Wildland Resource Management’s prescriptive vegetation management plan document is exactly correct.

However, outside of the annual OFD vegetation management inspection, this mission critical plan component for defensible space and evacuation route safety has been relegated to a maintenance of effort that is incumbent upon HRS for self-guided compliance. The successful effectiveness of the vegetation management plan lies primarily with this HRS self-monitoring system—for which HRS has no track-record, as the plan has not been implemented.

Even under the best of circumstances, a prudent regulatory approach to compliance by the FPB does not (and should not) award self-inspection privileges to any entity with less than 5-years of a successful “no violations” history. Otherwise, there is no basis for a proven record of compliance upon which to sustain a “self-inspection” designation privilege.

Head-Royce School--Ability to Evacuate In Case of Wildfire:

DEIR Appendix 16B makes a very strong case *against* HRS expansion (regarding mass evacuation planning). Additionally, as noted in DEIR Chapter 16 as well as Appendix 16B, both the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) Annex for Oakland and the City of Oakland Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP) remain silent on a publicly facing emergency evacuation plan that would include HRS.

Therefore, according to DEIR Appendix 16B, page 8, “...*the lack of [Oakland LHMP] planning specifically for evacuation response and preparedness indicates that Head-Royce School will likely have to be its own decision-maker in a wildfire...*” Again, the crux of any modicum of success for the mission critical plan component of an emergency mass evacuation plan is incumbent upon HRS for a self-guided system—with only infrequent testing of the system (and self-reporting) with no written mechanism for validation by any entity of the public safety operations community (Fire, Police, or Public Works).

Recommendations for a Bona Fide Mass Evacuation Plan:

It is recommended that a bona fide mass evacuation plan be developed immediately, with real training for students, staff, and parents (not one based on conceptual actions of teachers taking a moment to review the plan in an emergency, and then be expected to immediately execute a safe and effective mass evacuation plan in a self-organized fashion of priorities & purpose). By then it is too late. The mass evacuation plan should be developed with a legitimate consultant who specializes in emergency planning & evacuation—in conjunction with a vetting process through:

- OFD FPB
- Emergency Services
- OPD Traffic Division
- Public Works—Transportation Planning

The mass evacuation plan should absolutely be part and parcel of a larger HRS emergency plan—as it stands. However, the complexity and uniqueness of evacuating a 900 (current) student population (and 1250 students with the proposed expansion)—along with faculty and staff, into a populated neighborhood, poses extraordinary challenges for safety and success, and raises myriad questions that have not been addressed in the DEIR:

Appendix 16B:

Mr. Stephen Wong concludes in the DEIR, Appendix 16B, page 2 that the “...*concerted effort to outline and define key communications processes and protective actions with an evacuation plan is commendable...*”

Opinion:

The HRS evacuation plan is altogether ineffective, as written. Moreover, it does not address the basic tenets of accommodating a mass evacuation situation affecting school-aged children, and the ADA. Mr. Wong continues in DEIR Appendix 16B to outline multiple egress obstacles for an evacuation from the campus, which amplify the inadequacies of the HRS emergency mass evacuation plan:

Opinion:

Campus Layout and Egress (DEIR Appendix, 16B pages 2, 3):

- The nine-gate system of egress from the campus is fraught with obstacles to any acceptable standard of mass evacuation—particularly for K-6 students. Moreover, none of the identified means of egress are ADA compliant
- All means of egress involve either narrow stairs (Main Gate, Middle Gate exits), steep inclines (Solar Panel Stairs), or both (Main Gate Side Stairs). There are no sidewalks on roadways (Tennis Court exit—Whittle Rd.). Pedestrians and vehicles share the same egress roadway (Funston Place exit)—mixing dozens of vehicles with hundreds of vulnerable pedestrians in the same emergency mass evacuation egress pathway. Even under non-emergency situations this is a dangerous and unsafe situation.
- One gate is unmarked and leads to a dirt path overgrown with vegetation (Side Funston Place exit).
- Electric vehicle gates (Upper Gate, Funston Place Exit) have no emergency back-up power source and no adjacent pedestrian exit way.
 - If there were an adjacent pedestrian exit way—based on the inadequacy of the other HRS gates in the system, it is questionable these would be sufficient to accommodate a mass evacuation—thus easily lending itself to a crowd-panic scenario in which people could become crushed at the narrow gate “choke-point.”
 - The hallmark case-study of life safety/panic disasters is the *December 3, 1979, Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum concert* in which *11 people were crushed to death* when inadequate doors were opened to let concertgoers *into* the venue.⁵
- In an emergency mass evacuation scenario, when hundreds of people (in the case of HRS, many between the ages of 5-11) are escaping a dangerous situation, the current HRS emergency exit plan only serves to exacerbate the seriousness of the danger to human life. For this case-in-point, a picture is worth a thousand words (see: unedited KTVU/Fox news footage of 1991 Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm, evacuation here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NseOhUqZA0>)

Transportation and Evacuation from the Neighborhood (DEIR Appendix, 16B pages 4, 5):

This section successfully outlines the elements of HRS’s inability to effectively evacuate the campus, and observes the HRS evacuation situational shortcomings, as it exists today. Mr. Stephen Wong discusses three obvious modes of mass evacuation: pedestrian, vehicular, and cycling.

With the current campus census of 906 students and 200 staff, and a proposal for an additional 344 students (+additional staff) under the HRS expansion, that makes for 1440+ people (many under the age of 12) trying to execute a mass evacuation under an emergency fire and panic situation.

⁵ “...It caused what an expert consulted by the task force later called a “crowd craze,” in which an “induced sense of urgency” sends a group into a bottleneck. With so many people packed together, research engineer John J. Fruin [wrote to the task force in February 1980](#), “the crowd became an almost fluid mass.” Waves coursed through it, the small movement of one person sending ripples to the next...” --Washington Post, 11/ 9/2021.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/11/09/the-who-concert-tragedy/>

Pedestrian Evacuation (DEIR Appendix 16B, page 4): The Plan proposes an estimated 1400 persons walking down the road in a calm, organized fashion under emergency mass evacuation circumstances.

Opinion:

This concept has not been thoroughly vetted, as there is not a developed component of how the campus population will be organized. And it raises more questions than provides solutions. Such as:

- What is the span of control for supervisory accountability between staff and students?
- How are staff and students accounted for through each step of the process (classroom “all clear,” rally points, along the travel route (some up to 1-mile), and at the designated evacuation assembly points)?
- How does HRS propose to safely manage students of multiple ages along the roadway, in traffic, under emergency mass evacuation conditions?
- Have the assembly points been approved by the property owners?
- Have the assembly points been vetted for conflict with any other City emergency plans?

For all intents and purposes the designated HRS mass evacuation gates and exits provide no viable emergency evacuation egress points from campus. This is not a legitimate plan for an emergency mass evacuation of several hundred people—some as young as 5-years old. This is unacceptable. The mass evacuation plan also has no ADA accommodations component to it, directing evacuees to multiple narrow sets of stairs—some with an uphill emergency exit path of travel for pedestrians.

Multiple gates are non-functional for pedestrian egress, and are either designed for vehicular traffic only, are electrically actuated with no back-up power system (or both), and one is padlocked (Side Funston Place Exit—Appendix 16B, page 3). The California Fire Code prescribes that all **exit doors**, including manually operated horizontal sliding **doors**, shall be openable from the inside **without** use of a key or any **special knowledge** or effort ([Chapter 10: Means of Egress, California Fire Code 2019](#)).

Vehicular Evacuation (DEIR Appendix 16B, page 4):

This section (DEIR Appendix 16B, pages 4, 5) analyzes two possible options for a vehicular evacuation mode: buses and private vehicles—which also connotes by virtue of a “suggestive” nature, that there is nothing developed in an HRS written emergency plan, for this mode.

Buses:

While this is a good option for moving large numbers of people at once, the six available buses only accommodate 1/3 of the campus at once. And, while there is potential of shuttling people off-campus with several runs, there is no apparent written plan for activating this bus system in a timely fashion, with qualified drivers, in an emergency. There is also not a planned design-system for accommodating a shuttle service, nor has a shuttle system been vetted for conflicts with City emergency plans for traffic, during an evacuation situation. There is also not an accountability component for the bus mode, to insure no one is left behind. This element should be fully pre-planned for this resource to even be a viable option—and this element has not been pre-planned.

Vehicular Evacuation:

I agree with Mr. Stephen Wong in that use of student and staff private vehicles to evacuate themselves and others would require an extraordinary amount of pre-planning [and training] and would expose HRS to a significant liability concern.

Cycling Evacuation:

I agree with Mr. Stephen Wong’s assessment that students attempting to evacuate via bicycle presents a danger to themselves and to others under an emergency mass evacuation condition. This option should be

prohibited (to the extent possible)—which begs the “emergency mass evacuation accountability” question, once again.

Conclusions:

Mr. Stephen Wong makes several observations and recommendations in DEIR Appendix 16B in which the shortcomings of HRS’s emergency mass evacuation planning become glaringly apparent.

Granted HRS is a private entity. However, given the location (and large student census) it is vexing how little attention has been given to coordination with the OFD, OPD and Oakland Emergency Services regarding not only HRS, but also the adjacent LDS Temple, Immersion Preschool, Ascension Cathedral, Ability Now (with multiple wheelchair user clients), and the UCP Plant Exchange Event Center—all affecting the dynamics for mass evacuation of the campus and neighborhood.

The DEIR does not, at any point, address an evacuation plan and procedure component for the *newly proposed south campus and it’s proposed 344 new students (plus staff)*. This increase in students and staff population only serves to further magnify the deficiencies of the HRS emergency mass evacuation plan. Thus, placing even more emphasis and urgency on the need to resolve the inadequacies of the schematically skeletal mass evacuation plan discussed in the DEIR.

Moreover, there is a high degree of need that a bona fide mass evacuation plan should be *vetted* through the public safety community of the OFD (FPB and Emergency Services) in the same manner as a high-rise facility is required to. The OPD Traffic Division should review the plan for impact and conflict with other street evacuation protocols—and to insure it is incorporated and in compliance with existing OPD plans. Also, Oakland Public Works—Transportation Planning Division should review the plan for impacts on the existing Traffic Impact Analysis and established traffic service level rating(s) for the area. Once completed, the HRS Board should thoroughly review the plan before approval and adoption—and mandate that all faculty, staff, students, and parents be trained on the plan, with a minimum of semi-annual exercises (at least one observed by the OFD). Try to visualize 900-1200 students (plus faculty & staff) trying to simultaneously get onto the same streets as evacuating residents and businesses—without training.

The evacuation plan described in the DEIR has many unsupported conclusions, and a contrived approach to safety procedures without any measure of practical application or execution. The health and safety liability associated with this is not of an acceptable measure. A school organization that is responsible for over 1,000 people on a daily basis, cannot write a mass evacuation plan in the absence of experiential expertise. To take this approach is a recipe for disaster in an emergency, holding increasingly significant potential for people (especially the vulnerable population of primary grade school-aged children, and the ADA at-risk population) to be lost, injured, or killed. In the aftermath of such a disaster the public and the media will turn to HRS, the City, and OFD to ask, “*How could you let this happen?*”

Recommendations:

I am in disagreement with Mr. Stephen Wong’s assumption that “*It is also highly unlikely (but not improbable) that a wildfire would reach this [HRS] destination...*” (DEIR Appendix 16B, page 7). Quite to the contrary, as all the wildfire history evidence presented herein demonstrates, the likelihood for a wildfire starting in the Oakland Hills and reaching HRS is of an extremely high and dangerous likelihood; and, that HRS should in all due diligence plan accordingly—which all evidence in the DEIR indicates HRS has not done sufficiently.

To remedy this situation, HRS should immediately move to execute a concentrated effort toward the following elements for an emergency mass evacuation plan:

A Bona Fide Written Emergency Plan:

- Develop a written *campus mass evacuation plan and procedure*, completed with the expertise of a professional consultant who specializes in evacuation; with some particular emphasis on routes, alternate routes, exit design calculations, pedestrian planning and flow rates, evacuee accountability, ADA compliance considerations, and designs for emergency movement via bus-shuttle systems. The plan should be written in cooperation with the OFD and City of Oakland Local Hazard Mitigation Plan, to include, but not be limited to:
- A decision-making process for initiating evacuation.
- A campus accountability system to ensure all persons are safely evacuated.

Campus Staff Training

- Training in supervising and managing a mass evacuation of students K-12, with ADA considerations for the campus population with mobility needs. Particularly in managing students walking distances of up to 1-mile to an assembly point.
- Pre-designated assembly points for parents or guardians. It is recommended that a new, thoroughly developed plan be written for adequately communicating emergency evacuation information, and instructions to parents or guardians, to reunify with their students.
 - The plan should contain a methodology for primary, secondary, and tertiary assembly sites—based on the circumstances; and not de facto reporting to one pre-designated location to await further instructions.

Coordinated Emergency Communications:

- A coordinated emergency communication plan for real time updates with the City of Oakland Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and/or OFD Operations Center (DOC).
- A planned interface relationship between a dedicated HRS representative and the Liaison Officer designated by the City of Oakland Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). This designee could request pre-authorization to report to the EOC, as do public schools.

Semi-annual Exercises:

- It is recommended that HRS **should absolutely** conduct semi-annual evacuation exercises with at least one being in coordination with OFD, to ensure that the campus is well-indoctrinated toward an emergency reflex response to a disaster.
- The role of exercises cannot be *over-stated* in preparing the campus for a wildfire.

Other notable assumptions in Appendix 16B that HRS :

These items should address immediately, as integral components to a written emergency plan, include:

- It is noted in DEIR, Appendix 16B, page 8 (Additional Notes and Observations), that the Oakland 2016-2021 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan and the Oakland Safety Plan do not have a publicly facing evacuation plan or response plan.
 - **This does not absolve HRS** from working diligently with the City, and HRS's own consultant, toward the best practices objectives of responsibly protecting their students, staff, and the neighborhood from the effects of a mass evacuation during a wildfire.
 - HRS staff should thoroughly review all pertinent documents in preparation for a bona fide plan to protect the population of the campus and the neighborhood.
- ***Shelter-in-place should not be a protective action*** under wildfire conditions, as this has extremely high potential for leading to injury or death.
 - It is strongly recommended that a dedicated HRS Liaison be designated to coordinate strong, direct lines of communication with City officials (OFD, OPD, Emergency Services) as paramount to an HRS emergency plan and decision-making process for initiating evacuation.

- It is recommended that **HRS make a capital investment in an emergency back-up power generator system** for the campus—to power essential functions during an emergency.

Interim Mitigation Actions:

In addressing the lack of an acceptable mass evacuation plan for HRS, it is recommended that interim mitigation actions be taken, immediately. As to do nothing towards mitigation is a strategy that exposes students, staff, and the neighborhood residents to an extremely high-risk during an emergency.

Until such time as a bona fide mass evacuation plan is completed, it is strenuously recommended (with OFD enforcement) that on any extremely high fire and weather day, a strict Fire Watch provision should be in place at HRS, to conduct classes at full-capacity occupancy

During Red Flag Days⁶ (extremely high fire and weather danger) in lieu of cancelling classes HRS should comply with strict Fire Watch measures imposed by the Oakland Fire Marshal. Otherwise, to “do nothing,” or adopt a “wait and see” position until there is a wildfire or other emergency will only result in exposure of the students, staff, and neighborhood to an extraordinary health and safety risk.

Interim Mitigation Actions recommended to include, at a minimum:

- On-site, professionally trained fire watch personnel (qualifications, number, and type to be approved by the OFD FPB) for coordinating the execution of a mass evacuation.
- A radio/cell communications plan in place, capable of coordinating with Oakland Emergency Services Liaison Officer (as established in the California State-adopted SEMS⁷ organizational chart).
- Establish and implement a Red Flag Day “bus readiness” plan, complete with qualified drivers at the ready and a comprehensive shuttle service plan, to be in place for rapid deployment in case an emergency mass evacuation is required.

Extreme Interim Mitigation Actions:

Absent effective Interim Mitigation Actions and a viable mass evacuation plan approved for implementation (given the HRS location, and the absence of viable egress to safely mass evacuate campus to safety, simultaneously with the neighborhood) the following extreme compliance measures are recommended to include, but not limited to:

More-to-most severe interim mitigation actions to include:

- Reduce campus census by relocating or cancelling primary grade classes (K-6) on Red Flag Days.

⁶ A Red Flag Warning is issued for weather events which may result in extreme fire behavior that will occur within 24 hours. A Fire Weather Watch is issued when weather conditions could exist in the next 12-72 hours. A Red Flag Warning is the highest alert. During these times extreme caution is urged by all residents, because a simple spark can cause a major wildfire. A Fire Weather Watch is one level below a warning, but fire danger is still high. See CalFire link: <https://www.fire.ca.gov/programs/communications/red-flag-warnings-fire-weather-watches/>

⁷ As a result of the Oakland East Bay Hills Firestorm of 1991, California State Senator Nicolas Petris introduced SB 1841. Subsequently, the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) was adopted by California in 1993 under the Emergency Services Act. A primary function of SEMS is Multi-jurisdictional Coordination. California Office of Emergency Services. The Liaison Officer position in the command structure, is the point-of-contact for other agencies. <https://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/planning-preparedness/standardized-emergency-management-system> California Department of Social Services <https://www.cdss.ca.gov/dis/res/13Supplemental%20NIMS%20PG.pdf>

- Red Tag (close) the campus on Red Flag Days (similar to that of an east coast snow day), until a bona fide evacuation plan can be properly implemented.

This concludes my analysis, and commentary of top 20 recommendations, in response to the HRS DEIR for expansion to a south campus. Do not hesitate to contact me with any questions.

Respectfully,

William Weisgerber

William Weisgerber
Weisgerber Consulting

Cc: file

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SUMMARY

Experienced executive with progressive fire service, public **safety management** and strategic planning expertise. Leverages proven leadership skills in management, budget, planning, emergency communications, and labor relations at the local government level. Brings professional acumen specific to the fire department and emergency services, as well as general municipal management, and comprehensive executive search, recruitment, and placement services. Possesses strong collaborative ability with local senior staff, sub-regional, regional, and State committees for the benefit of public safety. Diligent, organized, committed.

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Arts, Management - St. Mary's College of California, Moraga, CA

Associate of Arts, Fire Science - San Jose City College, San Jose, CA

CERTIFICATIONS

Certified Chief Officer, CA (State Fire Marshal) Fire Service Training and Education System

Certified—Fire Protection Self-Assessment and Organizational Evaluation, CA Fire Academy

Certified—Emergency Management Planning, CA Specialized Training Institute

EXPERIENCE

Fire Chief/Fire Service Consultant

2005-Present

In the capacity of fire chief and public safety consultant for city, county, and special district organizations, apply professional expertise to perform management responsibilities as an integral component to successful resolution of complex personnel, labor relations and administrative issues; and the essential strategic processes for mitigating multi-faceted budget deficits and service delivery deficiencies. Skilled and experienced in executing **functional public safety and emergency management roles**, strategic master planning, conducting comprehensive municipal executive searches, recruitment, and placement process services.

Weisgerber Consulting, Mountain View, CA

2020

- **CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW FIRE DEPARTMENT, FIRE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAU**

Weisgerber Consulting provided comprehensive analysis and recommendations to assist in developing, building, and implementing strategies for the Fire and Environmental Protection Bureau (FEPB) of the Mountain View Fire Department—now and into the future. The primary areas of interrelated focus shaping these strategies and recommendations included:

- Reorganization and Strategic Master Plan for the FEPB comprised of:
 - Analysis and recommendations to strengthen effectiveness of staff deployment, supervisory span of control, and administrative support—maximizing resources and cost recovery revenue
 - Developed Succession Plan and staff development template
 - Analysis and recommendations for Inspection Program workload and Fee Schedule (Cost Recovery)
 - Analysis and recommendations for Database Replacement
 - Developed 5-year Technology Capital Outlay Program

Interim Fire Marshal, Oakland CA

2018-2019

- **CITY OF OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Division Chief in charge of Oakland Fire Department (OFD) Fire Prevention Bureau (FPB), overseeing a staff of 31 non-sworn and 3 sworn personnel. Responsible for management of fire and life safety regulation and compliance programs in a modern urban city with a population of over 400,000 residents—and a daytime population employing an additional 100,000 people. The depth and breadth of FPB operations encompasses plan check review, inspection and permitting for: new construction; CA state-mandated buildings and systems; annual fire code operating permits; engine company referral programs re: fire cause investigation and faulty fire alarm systems; vegetation management; cannabis industry and hazardous materials facilities; and actively participates with the Planning and Building Department in identifying and mitigating dangerous buildings.

- Addressed over 200 dangerous building referrals in six-months.
- Reduced Plan-check Review backlog from 675 to zero, in six-months.
- Oversaw reconciliation of inventory—recommending annual required inspection hours to staffing and supervisor ratios.
- Oversaw Data migration process (OneStep to Accela) to create uniform platform with Planning & Building.

Large scale special events and pyrotechnic inspection and permitting—for fire and life safety compliance—are conducted on a regular basis, multiple times per week (including NBA-Warriors, NFL-Raiders, MLB-A's). Oakland FPB is responsible for an inventory of approximately 11,000 permitted and mandated inspection occupancies; over 10,000 buildings with nearly 50,000 businesses; and 25,000 vegetation management inspections. A very robust Public Fire Education Program—pre-school to seniors—also resides within the Oakland FPB.

Weisgerber Consulting, El Macero, CA**2018-Present**

- **EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TRAINING & EXERCISE DELIVERY – CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICES COMPANY**

- Weisgerber Consulting provides statewide, on-site delivery of Emergency Preparedness training and exercises for management, supervisory and field personal of private water utility— bringing real-life practical experience to the training space, in transitioning daily operations, to emergency/disaster response, in Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and filed response. Training/exercise blocks include:
- Company-wide EOC operations of water utility emergency components in disaster response
- Coordination with local, state, and federal government—within National Response Framework (NRF).
- Field first-responder “Boots on the Ground;” shifting from daily to emergency/disaster operations.
- Implementation of state and federally adopted emergency management systems (SEMS/NIMS/ICS)

Weisgerber Consulting, Sonoma, CA**2017-2018**

- **FIRE PROTECTION CONSULTANT – CAYMUS BUILDERS; BILL JASPER-DEVELOPER**

Weisgerber Consulting was engaged with residential project, consulting on fire safety elements for development in Sonoma, CA (Fourth St. East/Brazil St.). Project is supported by strong civil engineering and adopted fire safety techniques for residential design in wildland-urban interface (“WUI”) environments.

- Analysis of design and mitigation efforts determined to be well-planned, attentive to/surpassing all aspects of fire safety and protection required under adopted code regulations for WUI construction.
- Components in project design positively impact active and passive environments of structure protection and defensible space—credibly improving fire protection from immediate WUI exposure.

Weisgerber Consulting, El Macero, CA**2017-Present**

- **DIGITAL SPACE CONSULTANT – THIRD BRIDGE; ALPHASIGHTS**

Weisgerber Consulting, in the digital connectivity space, provides strategic generalist consultants with relevant professional fire service subject matter (SME) knowledge. Recent SME consults include:

- Ambulance response (EMS: ALS/BLS) services: criteria for internal service versus outsource contract delivery models.
- Firefighter e-learning: certification prep; in-service training hours.
- Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): purchase process criteria for equipment and maintenance service.
- Public safety equipment distribution: uniform/equipment purchasing criteria for first-responders: (Fire, EMS, Law).

Weisgerber Consulting, Woodland, CA**2016 - 2017**

- **FIRE CHIEF SEARCH, RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT**

Principal consultant for a national search, to fill recently re-constituted Woodland Fire Chief position. Designed and implemented search and recruitment strategy that produced a diverse, qualified candidate pool for screening finalists, conducting panel interviews, moving top three recommended candidates to the hiring manager. This was managed on an expedited schedule over 90 days (announcement to job offer). The vacancy for the position had been previously held, for 5 years, by the retiring incumbent—in a law enforcement-based combination Police-Fire Public Safety Manager model

- **FIRE STATION RELOCATION STRATEGY AND CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Principal consultant for strategic plan and project management to relocate City of Woodland Fire Station 3 to improve response times and fire station distribution, then re-purpose the existing 18,800 square foot fire station to new public safety use; including structural engineering and design to potentially accommodate: the Yolo Emergency Communication Agency (a 9-1-1 PSAP JPA); and the Yolo County Office of Emergency Services—each requiring approximately 9,000 square feet of space.

Interim Fire Chief, Stockton CA**2015****CITY OF STOCKTON FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Commanded Stockton Fire Department (SFD), operating 15 companies from 12 stations with 181 sworn members on three shifts, and an annual budget of \$41.46M. SFD responds to nearly 40,000 alarms each year (including 350-400 working structure fires)—one of the busiest fire departments in the nation. In this extremely active department, effectively restored productive labor-management communication from a previously collapsed relationship—re-establishing essential respect and trust in the office of the fire chief; oversaw launch of 9-1-1 communications JPA hosted by SFD Emergency Communications Division; identified funding for and delivered comprehensive **Hazardous Materials Technician-level training program** (offset by outside student tuition) allowing SFD to become **CA State-certified Haz-Mat Training site**; identified funding and conducted recruit selection process for unplanned second recruit academy in FY 15/16, to begin filling over 20 vacancies in front-line positions; resolved labor issues regarding new Wellness Program contract; established foundation for resolving labor issues over compensation.

Weisgerber Consulting (Senior Consultant, Associate to Mintier-Harnish), Sacramento, CA 2015**CAMERON PARK CSD FIRE PROTECTION STRATEGIC AND CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Developed analysis and recommendations for **Five-year Fire Protection Master Plan** and \$1.36M Capital Improvement Plan for Cameron Park CSD. Plans included: evaluation of response times; automatic/mutual-aid responses; fire station location/replacement /upgrades; capital outlay and replacement schedules for apparatus, personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatus; power rescue tools, and advanced life support intervention equipment; and on-going funding options. Vetted through fire department staff (CalFire contracted services), General Manager's office, and CSD Board of Directors sub-committee; plans were successfully adopted, unanimously, by the full Board.

Weisgerber Consulting/OES & Grant Special Projects Manager, West Sacramento, CA 2012-2015**CITY OF WEST SACRAMENTO FIRE DEPARTMENT**

Project Manager for Department of Water Resources Statewide Emergency Response Grant-funded, **Flood Emergency Response Plan and GIS-based Flood Mapping Project**. Successfully collaborated with city and county departments and partner agencies (Reclamation Districts Sac-UASI, FEMA). Designed and implemented **HSEEP registered EOC tabletop** exercises and deployed leading edge incident management technology (Digital Sandbox-7, now: **Haystax/CalCOP**) from DHS. Developed analysis and recommendations for strategic department organizational assessment. Capital Projects Manager for construction of training tower and "essential facility" improvements. Designed and implemented national search for Fire Division Chief recruitment, selection and hiring process.

Interim Fire Chief, Davis CA**2010-2012****CITY OF DAVIS/UC-DAVIS FIRE DEPARTMENTS**

Shared-services fire chief for the city and university, provided confident leadership in a highly engaged community, built successful relationships with policymakers, local leaders, and labor. Merged duplicate communications into a single dispatch center; consolidated two training programs under a single Division; implemented shared Duty Chief through reorganization and promotions; collaboratively negotiated modifications to outdated work rules for rank and file; constructively rebuilt Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program in City of Davis.

Weisgerber Consulting (Senior Consultant, SCI Consulting Group), Fairfield, CA**2009****SENIOR CONSULTANT; BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT FOR FIRE DISTRICT PUBLIC FINANCE OPTIONS**

As senior consultant for a public finance consulting firm for public, non-profit, and private sector organizations, efficiently completed strategic analysis, planning and development of public finance presentations to rural County Fire Chiefs Associations; brought proficient fire service expertise to delivery of presentations to Northern California Fire District Workshops on public finance in a "portfolio" approach to funding options.

Interim Executive Director, Yolo County Joint Powers Authority, Woodland, CA**2008 - 2009****YOLO EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (YECA)**

Developed and implemented plan to eliminate \$460,000 fund balance deficit; guided the implementation of a strategic agency funding plan and radio system build-out plan; effectively negotiated rank and file work rule modifications.

Interim Fire Chief and Emergency Management Consultant, West Sacramento, CA**2008****CITY OF WEST SACRAMENTO**

Successfully negotiated the withdrawal of PERB complaint by Local 522; organized and implemented fire recruit academy and promotional processes; prepared analysis for citywide "**All Hazards**" **Emergency Management Plan** update, and staffing recommendations for implementation of EMP update and staff training.

Interim Fire Chief, Brentwood, CA**2006 - 2008****EAST CONTRA COSTA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT**

Directed an evaluation of substandard service model with community stakeholder outreach; initiated discussions to reorganize governance to independent special district to create funding options through provisions of Proposition 218; met and conferred with Local 1230 to successfully introduce comprehensive operating policies and procedures.

Weisgerber Consulting (Senior Consultant, Williams Associates), Pleasanton, CA**2006 - 2007****CITY OF CONCORD OES PROJECT**

Revised/updated disaster Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), delivered **Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/EOP** staff training, and facilitated an EOC Tabletop Exercise to evaluate effectiveness of the plan and staff training, prior to successfully transitioning EOP to city staff.

Weisgerber Consulting (Senior Consultant, Robert Olsen Associates), Folsom, CA**2006****TOWN OF LOOMIS FIRE PROTECTION STUDY**

Completed service analysis and funding recommendations for underserved areas that were adopted by the governing board, which then successfully passed a Proposition 218 election for implementing the recommended Benefit Assessment amount, to achieve desired levels of fire service delivery.

Milpitas Fire Department - Milpitas, CA**1974-2005**

Comprehensive professional fire service career, promoting through the ranks to the position of Fire Chief of the Milpitas, CA, Fire Department—a vital component in the Santa Clara County (Silicon Valley) mutual-aid system.

Fire Chief**1998 –2005****MILPITAS FIRE DEPARTMENT**

- Managing a full-service fire department running engine-based and truck/USAR-based paramedic companies, and a hazardous materials response team; operating budget of \$15.6M; successfully ensured the development, training, and growth of modern suburban fire department with contiguous borders to San Jose, Santa Clara, and Fremont; actively engaged in the Santa Clara County local emergency response system.
- **Santa Clara County Operational Area, Approval Authority Representative:** Santa Clara County Fire Chief's representative to the Approval Authority. Administering CA Department of Homeland Security grant monies, ensuring comprehensive analysis of regional needs for terrorism prevention and response; employing regional approach to Response, Planning, Equipment, and Training & Exercises.
- **Steering Committee Charter Member, Silicon Valley Radio Interoperability Project (SVRIP):** Sole fire service representative to countywide communications project; integrating Fire, Police and Emergency Medical Services in radio and data interoperability. Eighteen jurisdictions, representing 30 public safety agencies, partnered to enhance inter-agency public safety communications during emergencies.
- **Co-chair, County Fire Chief's Technical Sub-committee for County EMS RFP:** Provided technical expertise to County/City Manager's for addressing unsatisfactory service delivery performance by ambulance providers. Established open, competitive bid environment incorporating equitable distribution of system financing; performance measures; system oversight and flexible supplement service over vendor.
- Directed three Divisions: Emergency Response, Fire Prevention and Emergency Preparedness: managing engine-based Advanced Life Support program; hazardous materials response; training, continuing education; directing Emergency Services for disaster planning, CERT; and training city staff (SEMS/NIMS).

Assistant Fire Chief/Fire Marshal**1994 –1998****MILPITAS FIRE DEPARTMENT**

- Second in Command of Fire Department; directed and coordinated full-service Fire Prevention Division, with a budget of \$1.5M, Directly responsible for upholding fire and life safety standards, hazardous/toxic materials regulations, plan-check review, investigation of fire cause and hazardous materials releases.
- Professionally managed negotiation of high-profile construction projects (McCarthy Ranch "big box" and Great Mall out-parcel expansions, largest single high-density Kaufman & Broad housing project in CA—800 units, and Phase-I of Midtown Specific Plan); instrumental in working with developers and businesses.
- **1994 and 1997 Uniform Fire Code; 2001 CA Fire Code:** Adopted local code amendments— in coordination with all Santa Clara County fire departments, providing a uniform regulatory environment for businesses operating throughout Silicon Valley.
- **Co-authored Local Residential Security Bars Ordinance:** Mitigating life-safety threats from fixed residential security bars; including notification, inspection, enforcement, and CDBG-funded retrofitting of release mechanisms.
- **Co-chaired ICBO Peninsula Chapter Sub-committee** on performance standards for residential security bar release mechanisms. Co-chaired Security Bar Ad Hoc Coalition (data clearinghouse coordinating Building/Fire Officials, NFPA Task Force, Underwriters Laboratories, insurance, and decorative iron industry).

Information Services Project Manager**1994 - 1998****CITY OF MILPITAS (COLLATERAL SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT TO THE CITY MANAGER)**

- Reporting directly to City Manager, effectively managed technology division professionals and budget of \$3M; responsible for Citywide Information Services activities, including hardware, software, and network.
- Implemented Information Technology (IT) policies and coordination of strategic five-year IT Master Plan.
- Directed facilities management contract; implemented comprehensive technology upgrades.
- Developed Employee Automation Policy and a five-year Capital Improvement Program for technology; renegotiated agreement for out-sourced Information Services (improved service, reduced costs, installed performance measures/penalties).
- Coordinated all technology efforts with independently developed Telecommunications Master Plan.

• Division Chief of Operations - MILPITAS, CA, FIRE DEPARTMENT	1990 - 1994
• Battalion Chief - MILPITAS, CA, FIRE DEPARTMENT	1988 –1990
• Captain - MILPITAS, CA, FIRE DEPARTMENT	1984 –1988
• Lieutenant - MILPITAS, CA, FIRE DEPARTMENT	1982 –1984
• Firefighter - MILPITAS, CA, FIRE DEPARTMENT	1974 –1982

Labor Relations.**1985 – present**

In managing personnel, labor relations and administration daily; have been instrumental in resolving or implementing processes for difficult ongoing labor issues, budget deficits, and administrative and service delivery deficiencies.

- **City of Stockton Fire Department (2015)** Fire Chief and management representative for labor relations with I.A.F.F. Local 456; restored productive labor-management communication from previously collapsed relationship; resolved issues of dispute regarding implementation of new Wellness Program contract; established foundation for resolving Hazardous Materials certification “add-pay” issues.
- **City of Davis and UC-Davis Fire Departments (2010-2012)** Fire Chief and management representative for labor relations with I.A.F.F., Local 3494 (City of Davis) and Local 4437 (UC-Davis); collaboratively negotiated modifications to outdated work rules for rank and file.
- **Yolo Emergency Communications Agency (2008 – 2009)** Executive Director and management representative for labor relations; negotiated comprehensive update to administrative policies; negotiated settlement of pre-existing FLSA dispute; strengthened process for vetting and mitigating labor relations issues.
- **West Sacramento Fire Department (2008)** Fire Chief and management representative for labor relations; resolved pending labor issues with I.A.F.F., Local 522 (including negotiated settlement of Public Employees Relations Board—PERB—Unfair Labor Practices complaint); established Committees for recommendations to resolve ancillary working conditions issues.
- **East Contra Costa FPD (2006-2008)** Fire Chief and management representative for labor relations with I.A.F.F., Local 1230; negotiated comprehensive update of administrative policies including meet and confer, grievance hearings and adjustments.
- **Milpitas Fire Department (1994-2005)** Fire Chief and management representative for labor relations with I.A.F.F., Local 1699; negotiations team member for City of Milpitas.
- **Milpitas Fire Department (1985-1988)** Past Union President/Chief Negotiator, Secretary, Treasurer: I.A.F.F., Local 1699

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/AFFILIATIONS

International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

League of CA Cities Fire Chief’s Representative: Transportation, Communications, Public Works Policy Committee

Northern California Fire Prevention Officers – Fire Code Development Committee

Santa Clara County Fire Chief’s Association, Past President, Secretary, Treasurer

County Fire Chiefs Association Past-Member (Contra Costa, Yolo, San Joaquin)

COMMUNITY SERVICE

East Davis County Fire Protection District—Board Chair

Yolo County Crisis Nursery—Development Campaign Cabinet

Yolo County Children’s Alliance

The El Macero Oaks HOA—Board Chair

Milpitas High School Athletic Booster Club, Donor, Supporter/Volunteer

Silicon Valley—East, Young Life Charity Golf Classic, Past Co-chair

American Cancer Society Relay for Life, Past Chair